Introduction
The Abuse Reporting Format [ARF] defines a message format for sending reports of abuse in the messaging infrastructure, with an eye towards automating both the generation and consumption of those reports. There is now also a desire to extend the ARF to include the reporting of messages that fail to authenticate using known message authentication methods, such as DomainKeys Identified Mail [DKIM] and Sender Policy Framework [SPF] , as these are sometimes evidence of abuse that can be detected and reported through automated means. The same mechanism can be used to convey forensic information about the specific reason the authentication method failed. Thus, this memo presents such extensions to ARF that allow for detailed reporting of message authentication method failures.
Definitions

Key Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS] .
Email Architecture
This memo uses some terms whose definitions and descriptions can be found in [EMAIL-ARCH].
Base64
Base64 is defined in Section 4 of [BASE64] .
The values that are base64 encodings MAY contain folding whitespace (FWS) for formatting purposes as per the usual header field wrapping defined in [MAIL] . During decoding, any characters not in the base64 alphabet are ignored so that such line wrapping does not harm the value. The ABNF token "FWS" is defined in [DKIM] . No other extensions to the valid base64 character set are permitted.
Technologies
There are technologies in email security that provide authentication services and some that do authorization. These are often conflated. A discussion that is useful for establishing context can be found in Section 1.5.2 of [AUTH-RESULTS].
ARF Extension for Authentication Failure Reporting
The current report format defined in [ARF] lacks some specific features required to do effective email authentication failure reporting. This section defines extensions to ARF to accommodate this requirement.
A single report describes a single email authentication failure. Multiple reports MAY be used to report multiple failures for a single message.
New ARF Feedback Type
A new feedback type, "auth-failure", is defined in this document as an extension, per Section 7.3 of [ARF] .
A message that uses this feedback type has the following modified header field requirements for the second (machine-parseable) [MIME] part of the report:
Authentication-Results: Syntax as specified in [AUTH-RESULTS].
Furthermore, [ARF] specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once; for this extension, this field MUST be present, but it MUST reflect only a single authentication method's result.
Original-Envelope-Id: Syntax as specified in [ARF] . Furthermore, [ARF] specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once; for this extension, this field's inclusion is RECOMMENDED, where that value is available, to aid in diagnosing the authentication failure.
Original-Mail-From: Syntax as specified in [ARF] . Furthermore, [ARF] specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once; for this extension, this field's inclusion is RECOMMENDED, where that value is available, to aid in diagnosing the authentication failure.
Source-IP: Syntax as specified in [ARF] . Furthermore, [ARF] specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once; for this extension, this field's inclusion is RECOMMENDED, where that value is available, to aid in diagnosing the authentication failure.
Reported-Domain: Syntax as specified in [ARF] . Furthermore, [ARF] specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once; for this extension, this field MUST be present if such a value is available.
Delivery-Result: As specified in Section 3.2.2. This field is OPTIONAL, but it MUST NOT appear more than once. If present, it SHOULD indicate the outcome of the message in some meaningful way, but it MAY be set to "other" for local policy reasons.
The third MIME part of the message is either of type "message/rfc822" (as defined in [MIME-TYPES]) or of type "text/rfc822-headers" (as defined in [REPORT] ) and contains a copy of the entire header block from the original message. This part MUST be included (contrary to [REPORT] , which makes it optional).
For privacy reasons, report generators might need to redact portions of a reported message, such as an identifier or address associated with the end user whose complaint action resulted in the report. A discussion of relevant issues and a suggested method for doing so can be found in [RFC6590] .
New ARF Header Field Names
The following new ARF field names are defined as extensions to Section 3.1 of [ARF] .
Required for All Reports
Auth-Failure: Indicates the failure from an email authentication method that is being reported. The list of valid values is enumerated in Section 3.3.
Optional for All Reports
Delivery DKIM-Identity: The identity of the signature that failed verification, taken from the "i=" tag of the signature.
DKIM-Selector:
The selector of the signature that failed verification, taken from the "s=" tag of the signature.
Optional for DKIM Reports
DKIM-Canonicalized-Header: A base64 encoding of the canonicalized header of the message as generated by the verifier.
DKIM-Canonicalized-Body: A base64 encoding of the canonicalized body of the message as generated by the verifier. The encoded content MUST be limited to those octets that contribute to the DKIM body hash (i.e., the value of the "l=" tag; see Section 3.7 of [DKIM] ).
If DKIM-Canonicalized-Header and DKIM-Canonicalized-Body encode redacted data, they MUST NOT be included. Otherwise, they SHOULD be included. The data presented there have to be exactly the canonicalized header and body as defined by [DKIM] and computed at the verifier. This is because these fields are intended to aid in identifying message alterations that 
Authentication Failure Types
The list of defined email authentication failure types used in the "Auth-Failure:" header field (defined above), is as follows:
adsp: The message did not conform to the author domain's published [ADSP] signing practices. The DKIM-ADSP-DNS field MUST be included in the report.
bodyhash: The body hash in the signature and the body hash computed by the verifier did not match. The DKIM-Canonicalized-Body field SHOULD be included in the report (see Section 3.2.4).
revoked: The DKIM key referenced by the signature on the message has been revoked. The DKIM-Domain and DKIM-Selector fields MUST be included in the report. signature: The DKIM signature on the message did not successfully verify against the header hash and public key. The DKIM-Domain and DKIM-Selector fields MUST be included in the report, and the DKIM-Canonicalized-Header field SHOULD be included in the report (see Section 3.2.4).
spf: The evaluation of the author domain's SPF record produced a "none", "fail", "softfail", "temperror", or "permerror" result.
("none" is not strictly a failure per [SPF] , but a service that demands successful SPF evaluations of clients could treat it like a failure.)
Supplementary data MAY be included in the form of comments compliant with [MAIL] . For example, "Auth-Failure: adsp" could be augmented by a comment to indicate that the failed message was rejected because it was not signed when it should have been. See Appendix B for an example.
Syntax for Added ARF Header Fields
The [ABNF] definitions for the new fields are as follows:
auth-failure = "Auth-Failure:" [CFWS] ( "adsp" / "bodyhash" / "revoked" / "signature" / "spf" ) [CFWS] CRLF ; "CFWS" is defined in [MAIL] delivery-result = "Delivery-Result:" [CFWS] ( "delivered" / "spam" / "policy" / "reject" / "other" ) [CFWS] CRLF dkim-header = "DKIM-Canonicalized-Header:" [CFWS] base64string CRLF ; "base64string" is defined in [DKIM] dkim-sig-domain = "DKIM-Domain:" [CFWS] domain-name [CFWS] CRLF ; "domain-name" is defined in [DKIM] dkim-identity = "DKIM-Identity:" [CFWS] [ local-part ] "@" domain-name [CFWS] CRLF ; "local-part" is defined in [MAIL] dkim-selector = "DKIM-Selector:" [CFWS] selector [CFWS] CRLF ; "selector" is defined in [DKIM] dkim-adsp-dns = "DKIM-ADSP-DNS:" [CFWS] quoted-string [CFWS] CRLF ; "quoted-string" is defined in [MAIL] dkim-body = "DKIM-Canonicalized-Body:" [CFWS] base64string 
IANA Considerations
As required by [IANA] , this section contains registry information for the extension to [ARF] .
Updates to ARF Feedback Types
The following feedback type has been added to the Feedback Report Type Values registry: Security issues with respect to these reports are similar to those found in [DSN].
Inherited Considerations
Implementers are advised to consider the Security Considerations sections of [DKIM] , [ADSP] , [SPF] , and [ARF].
Forgeries
These reports can be forged as easily as ordinary Internet electronic mail. User agents and automatic mail-handling facilities (such as mail distribution list exploders) that wish to make automatic use of Delivery Status Notifications (DSNs) of any kind should take appropriate precautions to minimize the potential damage from denialof-service attacks.
Security threats related to forged DSNs include the sending of a. A falsified email authentication method failure notification when the message was in fact delivered to the indicated recipient;
b. Falsified signature information, such as selector, domain, etc.
Perhaps the simplest means of mitigating this threat is to assert that these reports should themselves be signed with something like DKIM. On the other hand, if there's a problem with the DKIM infrastructure at the verifier, signing DKIM failure reports might produce reports that aren't trusted or even accepted by their intended recipients.
Automatic Generation
Automatic generation of these reports by verifying agents can cause a denial-of-service attack when a large volume of email is sent that causes email authentication failures for whatever reason.
Limiting the rate of generation of these messages might be appropriate but threatens to inhibit the distribution of important and possibly time-sensitive information.
In general ARF feedback loop terms, it is suggested that report generators only create these (or any) ARF reports after an out-ofband arrangement has been made between two parties. This mechanism then becomes a way to adjust parameters of an authorized abuse report feedback loop that is configured and activated by private agreement rather than starting to send them automatically based solely on discovered data in the DNS.
Envelope Sender Selection
In the case of transmitted reports in the form of a new message, it is necessary to consider the construction and transmission of the message so as to avoid amplification attacks, deliberate or otherwise. See Section 5 of [ARF] for further information.
Reporting Multiple Incidents
If it is known that a particular host generates abuse reports upon certain incidents, an attacker could forge a high volume of messages that will trigger such a report. The recipient of the report could then be inundated with reports. This could easily be extended to a distributed denial-of-service attack by finding a number of reportgenerating servers.
The incident count referenced in [ARF] provides a limited form of mitigation. The host generating reports may elect to send reports only periodically, with each report representing a number of identical or near-identical incidents. One might even do something inverse-exponentially, sending reports for each of the first ten incidents, then every tenth incident up to 100, then every 100th incident up to 1000, etc., until some period of relative quiet after which the limitation resets.
The use of this technique for "near-identical" incidents in particular causes a degradation in reporting quality, however. If, for example, a large number of pieces of spam arrive from one attacker, a reporting agent might decide only to send a report about a fraction of those messages. While this averts a flood of reports to a system administrator, the precise details of each incident are similarly not sent.
Redaction of Data in DKIM Reports
This memo requires that the canonicalized header and body be returned without being subject to redaction when a DKIM failure is being reported. This is necessary to ensure that the returned canonicalized forms are useful for debugging, as they must be compared to the equivalent form at the signer. If a message is altered in transit, and the returned data are also redacted, the redacted portion and the altered portion may overlap, rendering the comparison results meaningless. However, unredacted data can leak information the reporting entity considers to be private. It is for this reason the return of the canonicalized forms is not required.
